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Abstract
Actor-level variations in the amounts of uncertainty has been widely ignored in the
growing literature on statistical models of strategic interaction in international rela-
tions. In this paper, I provide a tool for testing theories about the level of uncertainty
in strategic interactions. I show that ignoring potential variations in levels of uncer-
tainty across diﬀerent cases can be a source of bias for empirical analyses. I propose
a method to incorporate this form of heteroskedasticity into existing estimators and
show that this method can improve inferences. With a series of Monte Carlo exper-
iments, I evaluate the magnitude and the severity of the bias and inconsistency in
estimators that ignore heteroskedasticity. More importantly, the tools developed in
this paper have many interesting substantive application areas. Examples considered
include measuring speculators’ suboptimal behavior tendencies in international cur-
rency crises; and capturing varying levels of signaling and Bayesian updating behavior
in the recent strategic models of signaling.
∗This paper was previously presented at the 2010 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science
Association. I would like to thank Curtis Signorino, Elena McLean, Taehee Whang and David Carter for
valuable comments. I also thank the editor and the anonymous reviewers. All errors remain my own.
1 Introduction
In recent years, increased attention has been given in the international relations literature
to testing hypotheses about strategic interaction (Fearon, 1994b; Smith, 1999; Signorino,
1999; Schultz, 1999; Leblang, 2003; Signorino and Tarar, 2006; Bas, Signorino and Walker,
2008; McLean and Whang, 2010). More recently, scholars have focused on making sure that
empirical models used to test theories about strategic interaction are compatible with these
theories. Alternative estimators are developed depending on the form of the underlying
strategic interaction, ranging from simple 2-by-2 discrete choice dynamic games to games of
signaling, and dynamic continuous choice games (Signorino, 1999; Lewis and Schultz, 2003;
Esarey, Mukherjee and Moore, 2008; Ramsay and Signorino, 2009; Whang, 2010). Whether
the topic is deterrence (Signorino and Tarar, 2006), economic sanctions (Whang, 2010), or
international currency crises (Leblang, 2003), the use of these estimators made it possible
for the empirical estimation to follow closely and remain compatible with the underlying
theoretical model that involves strategic interaction.
One major advantage of these estimators - strategic models - is that they enable testing
non-monotonic hypotheses out of a theoretical model about the eﬀects of covariates of interest
on strategic actor behavior. Such hypotheses are hard to test with traditional logit or probit
regression models.1 Signorino and Yilmaz (2003) show that using logit or probit regression
models to capture strategic interaction results in functional form misspeciﬁcation akin to an
omitted variable bias.
Unlike in linear regression or probit, the error terms in strategic models are not just
nuisance parameters. They are usually theoretically motivated, and it is this feature that
makes statistically estimating a strategic model possible by providing the transition from a
1There is a debate in the literature about the usefulness of logit or probit in testing non-monotonic
hypotheses arising from strategic interaction. See Carrubba, Yuen and Zorn (2007a), Signorino (2007) and
Carrubba, Yuen and Zorn (2007b) for this debate.
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game theoretical model to a statistical model. One theoretical source of uncertainty pro-
posed, for instance, is the existence of boundedly rational actors that randomly deviate from
rational behavior in an unpredictable manner during game play (Signorino, 2003).2 More
frequently, private information that actors have about their payoﬀs has been used as a source
of uncertainty that converts game theoretical models into statistical models that can be es-
timated (Signorino, 2003; Lewis and Schultz, 2003; Whang, 2010). Signorino (2003) shows
that what the analyst chooses as the source of uncertainty in his or her statistical model is
important because each type of uncertainty results in diﬀerent probability models and the
misspeciﬁcation of the error structure can result in bias and inconsistency.
Regardless of the type of uncertainty, one common assumption in the existing statistical
strategic models is that the uncertainty is homoskedastic. If the source of uncertainty is
agents’ bounded rationality, homoskedasticity means that all the actors in the data set have
the same tendency to deviate from rational behavior, or that there is only one distribution
with constant mean and variance that represents the actors’ and the analyst’s prior belief
about a given actor’s deviations from rational behavior. Similarly, if the source of uncertainty
is private information, homoskedasticity implies that all the actors in the sample have the
same amount of private information about their payoﬀs.
Should researchers have any reasons to suspect heteroskedasticity in a strategic model
in international relations? Uncertainty is at the heart of strategic interaction, and accord-
ingly it plays an important role in theories of strategic interaction in international relations.3
Many theories predict that levels of uncertainty vary across diﬀerent actors or in diﬀerent
interactions (Fearon, 1994a; Schultz, 1998). Therefore, regardless of whether one is dealing
with bounded rationality or private information as the theoretical source of uncertainty, the
2The same assumption about actor rationality exists in McKelvey and Palfrey’s 1995; 1998 Quantal
Response Equilibrium.
3For instance, in an inﬂuential article, Fearon (1995) argues that uncertainty is one of the main reasons
why rational states ﬁght instead of reaching mutually preferable peaceful bargaining solutions.
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answer to the above question is likely to be yes.4 For instance, in making expected utility
comparisons, players might have diﬀering tendencies to deviate from optimality. Bounded
rationality is an individual characteristic, and as such the tendency to err is highly likely
to vary across diﬀerent actors in a given data set. Even with the same actor, this tendency
might vary depending on time, the environment, or the speciﬁc actors faced in a strategic
interaction. Assuming that everyone has the same likelihood and tendency to make mis-
calculations might be too restrictive. Similarly, in a private information speciﬁcation, the
severity of information asymmetry can change depending on actors’ characteristics or the
strategic environment. In the international conﬂict literature, for instance, there is a big
debate about the eﬀect of regime type on the amount of private information states have in
international conﬂict (Fearon, 1994a; Schultz, 1998, 1999, 2001). By limiting their focus to
homoskedastic models, empirical international relations scholars cannot incorporate these
possibilities into their research.
What are the consequences of disregarding heteroskedasticity? It has been widely known
that heteroskedasticity is only an eﬃciency problem in linear regression, and one’s estimates
remain unbiased and consistent even if he or she does not model heteroskedasticity (Greene,
2003). This result is not generalizable, however, to nonlinear regression models with dis-
crete dependent variables such as logit or probit (Yatchew and Griliches, 1985). As strategic
models can be regarded as multi-equation systems of probit and logit models, when not cor-
rectly modeled, heteroskedasticity might cause biased and inconsistent estimates in strategic
models as well. In other words, when we have theoretical expectations that each player in
a strategic model has a diﬀerent tendency to make suboptimal choices, or diﬀerent players
possess diﬀerent amounts of private information in a strategic situation, estimating conven-
4A quick look at the existing empirical analyses in the literature that employ strategic models supports
this statement. Most of these analyses use panel data, combining many actors that are observed over a
long period of time. Leblang (2003), for instance, uses a data set consisting of monthly observations of 90
developing economies from January 1985 to December 1998. It is highly likely that the levels of uncertainty
will show variation in such diverse samples.
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tional strategic probit or logit models with ﬁxed homoskedastic error variances may result
in bias.5
This paper aims to contribute to the burgeoning literature on strategic models and com-
plement the existing estimators in three ways: ﬁrst, I propose a method, heteroskedastic
strategic probit (HSP), that helps capture heteroskedasticity in strategic models and cor-
rect the potential bias and inconsistency when the data generating process violates the ho-
moskedasticity assumption.6 I demonstrate that HSP should be preferred over homoskedastic
SP when heteroskedasticity is suspected, except in very small samples, due to the relative
ineﬃciency and potential fragility of HSP in such samples. Secondly, and more importantly,
I show that HSP makes possible addressing many substantively interesting research ques-
tions by providing scholars with an opportunity to measure diﬀerent types of actor-level
uncertainty that exist in the strategic interactions they analyze. Finally, I show that the
proposed method can have better identiﬁcation properties in the sense that, under certain
conditions, it enables simultaneous estimation of multiple theoretical sources of uncertainty
in a given model, which is not possible to accomplish with existing homoskedastic strategic
models.
Scholars have previously noted a lack of attention given to theorizing the variance param-
eter – the “second moment” – in the empirical international relations literature (Braumoeller,
2006). They emphasized the importance and the potential value of substantively interpret-
ing heteroskedasticity instead of treating it just a nuisance (Downs and Rocke, 1979). Due
to the important role uncertainty plays in strategic interaction, it is even more important –
5The potential problems associated with a constant variance assumption have been acknowledged in the
recent literature on strategic models. In comparing diﬀerent models of strategic choice, Wand (2006) notes
that diﬀerent choices for the common constant variance parameter in strategic models result in diﬀerent
model predictions. Thus, if the data violates common variance assumption, one would expect that the
failure to take this into account in the statistical model would bias inferences.
6I use the label strategic probit (SP) to refer to strategic estimators with Normally distributed uncertainty
structure, as in Signorino (2003).
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and substantively more promising – to develop and test theories about variance in strategic
models. Thus, the HSP developed in this paper will hopefully prove to be very useful to
empirical scholars of international relations.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I derive the HSP estimator for
a simple 2-player discrete choice game. Then, using Monte Carlo simulations, I analyze
the bias in existing strategic models that do not model heteroskedasticity; investigate the
potential eﬀects of using a heteroskedastic estimator when heteroskedasticity is not present;
and examine the properties of a hybrid heteroskedastic model that incorporates multiple
sources of uncertainty. Finally, I discuss two application areas for HSP models. I ﬁrst
replicate Leblang’s (2003) analysis of speculative currency attacks using the HSP estimator,
and then discuss the potential extension of the technique to the recent statistical strategic
models of signaling and Bayesian updating.
2 Heteroskedastic Strategic Probit
Signorino (2003) proposes two distinct theoretical sources of uncertainty in statistical strate-
gic models. One source of uncertainty is agent error. With the agent error speciﬁcation, the
analyst assumes that players are boundedly rational, or they tend to misperceive each other’s
utilities, or they make errors in implementing their actions. A second source of uncertainty
is private information. In this speciﬁcation, a player possesses private information about his
payoﬀ from a particular outcome. It is assumed that only the player observes his true utility
from an outcome; his opponent and the analyst regard it as random and can only know its
distribution. In sum, “agent error allows for nonrational behavior or ‘accidents’, whereas
private information allows for rational behavior and incomplete information” (Signorino,
2003).
6
[Figure 1 about here]
Figure 1 represents these two sources of uncertainty graphically in the context of a simple
game theoretical model of international conﬂict between two states, denoted as Player 1 (P1)
and Player 2 (P2).
7 In this sequential model, P1 moves ﬁrst and chooses between attacking
P2 or not. If P1 does not attack, Status Quo is the outcome. If P1 attacks, then P2 decides to
resist or capitulate. In the ﬁrst case, the outcome is War. In the latter case, the outcome of
the game is Capitulation. Players have utilities associated with each outcome, and expected
utilities associated with each action that are derived based on the outcome utilities. Figure
1(A) depicts an agent error speciﬁcation: error is associated with Player 1’s comparison
of expected utilities of deciding to attack or not. That is, P1 makes an implementation
error or miscalculation while comparing the choices of attacking and not attacking. The
random component αij represents the suboptimal behavior by Pi for choosing the action j
that cannot be predicted by the opponent or the analyst. Similarly, Figure 1(B) presents a
private information speciﬁcation, in which the random components εij are attached to Pi’s
utilities, representing Player i ’s private information about his or her payoﬀ from outcome
j. These components cannot be observed directly by the opponent or the analyst, who only
have distributional information about the utility values.
The HSP model that I describe in this section shares an important feature with the
heteroskedastic probit model developed by Alvarez and Brehm (1995, 2002) to analyze the
heterogeneity in survey responses to abortion policy issues. In Alvarez and Brehm’s het-
eroskedastic probit model, the error standard deviation σi is assumed to vary across obser-
vations. In particular, σi is linked to regressors through a parametric functional form. This
7Although I introduce the heteroskedastic model with very a simple two-player sequential game to keep
the presentation simple in this paper, it is easy to incorporate the technique to more elaborate games such
as the International Interaction Game analyzed in Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) and Signorino
(1999). Also, heteroskedasticity can be incorporated into more complex games with signalling and Bayesian
updating (Lewis and Schultz, 2003; Whang, 2010). Later in the paper, I discuss the implications of ignoring
heteroskedasticity and the substantive beneﬁts from modeling it in such games.
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intuition will also underlie the HSP model presented below. Harvey (1976)’s multiplicative
heteroskedasticity speciﬁcation will be used throughout the paper to model heteroskedastic-
ity, in which the error standard deviation takes the following form:
σ = exp(Zα) (1)
where Z is the matrix of regressors that are assumed to aﬀect the variance of the error term,
and α is the coeﬃcient vector for these regressors.8
I now derive the HSP outcome probabilities and the log-likelihood function for the agent
error model presented in Figure 1(A).9
2.1 Heteroskedastic SP with Agent Error Speciﬁcation
The true utility for Player i from outcome Yj, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} is Ui(Yj), and both players can
observe this. Similarly, the expected utility calculated - potentially with error - by Player i
for action ak, k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} is EU∗i (ak). The analyst and the opponent cannot observe the
exact deviation from optimality involved in the calculation, but they possess distributional
information about agent error terms αik, which are assumed to follow a Normal distribution
with zero mean and variance ν2ik, denoted N(0, ν
2
ik). Thus, the analyst and the opponent
can calculate the expected value of the expected utilities with miscalculations averaged out,
which is EUi(ak).
In order to derive the choice probabilities, we need to work backwards up the game tree
as in the homoskedastic version presented in Signorino (2003). Denote Player 1’s probability
of choosing action a2 as p
AE
1 , and Player 2’s probability of choosing a4 as p
AE
2 . Player 2
8In a homoskedastic SP model, in contrast, depending on the interpretation, variance of the uncertainty
term is either assumed to be a known constant, usually 1, or the coeﬃcients are estimated and reported to
a scale of the unknown standard deviation, because of identiﬁcation restrictions.
9The private information version can be derived similarly, which is presented in the Appendix.
8
chooses a4 over a3 if EU
∗
2(a4) ≥ EU∗2(a3). Thus,
pAE2 = Pr(EU
∗
2(a4) ≥ EU∗2(a3)) (2)
= Pr(U2(Y3) + α24 ≥ U2(Y2) + α23) (3)
= Φ
(
U2(Y3)− U2(Y2)√
ν223 + ν
2
24
)
(4)
Deriving Player 1’s choice probability can be achieved in a similar way:
pAE1 = Pr(EU
∗
1(a2) ≥ EU∗1(a1)) (5)
= Pr((1− pAE2 )(U1(Y2)) + pAE2 (U1(Y3)) + α12 ≥ U1(Y1) + α11) (6)
= Φ
(
(1− pAE2 )U1(Y2) + pAE2 U1(Y3)− U1(Y1)√
ν211 + ν
2
12
)
(7)
Based on these action probabilities, the probability of reaching a particular outcome in the
strategic model depicted in Figure 1 can be calculated:
PrAE(Y1) = 1− pAE1 (8)
PrAE(Y2) = p
AE
1 (1− pAE2 ) (9)
PrAE(Y3) = p
AE
1 p
AE
2 (10)
How do we specify the heteroskedastic agent error variance in the above model? The variance
of the stochastic αij terms represent the players’ tendency to miscalculate and deviate from
the optimal action. αij terms are distributed normally with zero mean and variance ν
2
ij. The
standard deviations νij vary across diﬀerent observations as functions of regressors Z:
νij = exp(γZ) (11)
This error speciﬁcation is in the multiplicative form as discussed in Harvey (1976). There
is no constant term in the error speciﬁcation because of identiﬁcation restrictions.10 When
10This is akin to assuming that the variance parameter is equal to one in a homoskedastic probit model.
An alternative sometimes considered in the literature is not making this assumption, and instead estimating
coeﬃcients scaled by the square root of the unknown constant variance parameter. Similarly, an unknown
constant term can be added to the heteroskedastic error structure, which would imply that the coeﬃcient
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γ = 0, the variance term becomes constant across observations, and the heteroskedastic
model reduces to a homoskedastic SP model. For γ = 0, this speciﬁcation allows each ob-
servation (or actor) to have a potentially diﬀerent error variance. In other words, if agents
are state leaders, each leader potentially has a diﬀerent tendency to deviate from optimal
expected utility calculation, captured by the variance of the agent error term.
The log-likelihood function for the HSP estimator with agent error speciﬁcation is as
follows:
LAE =
N∑
n=1
3∑
j=1
Inj ln(Pr
AE(Ynj)) (12)
where Inj is the indicator function that takes the value 1 when the outcome is j in obser-
vation n and zero otherwise. PrAE(Ynj) is the outcome probability for outcome j in a given
observation n.
This model can be estimated very easily in common statistical software like Stata, R, or
Gauss. An example Stata code is included in the Appendix that shows how to deﬁne the
log-likelihood function and run the estimation procedure.
2.2 A Hybrid Model with Two Sources of Uncertainty
Agent error and private information as two sources of uncertainty need not be mutually
exclusive in a given strategic interaction. In fact, one can easily argue that, as two distinct
theoretical concepts, both sources of uncertainty are present in a strategic situation. We can
have players possessing private information about their payoﬀs, and at the same time making
miscalculations or implementation errors in their choices. In this case, a researcher would
need to be able to estimate the two sources simultaneously in a SP model. When the errors
are assumed to have constant variance, as in a homoskedastic model, a hybrid model of this
estimates in a player’s utilities are estimated to a scale.
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sort cannot be estimated, simply because the model cannot identify and isolate both error
variances. On the other hand, when certain identiﬁcation restrictions are satisﬁed, these two
sources of uncertainty can be incorporated into a single HSP model. In particular, when
the two sources of uncertainty are linked to mutually exclusive sets of regressors, a hybrid
model that incorporates both the agent error and private information speciﬁcations can be
estimated. For instance, in a crisis interaction model in international relations, based on
theoretical expectations from the literature, actor characteristics such as age, or experience
can be used to model bounded rationality, while regressors at the interaction or system
level such as system polarity, the distance between the two countries in conﬂict, or regime
type similarity, can be used to model private information variance. When shared factors
are hypothesized to aﬀect the two error variances for a given player, however, a hybrid
heteroskedastic model will no longer be identiﬁed, as two separate coeﬃcients for a regressor
that appears in both uncertainty variances cannot be estimated simultaneously.11
One obvious question that arises is what would happen when the underlying model is a
hybrid heteroskedastic model that incorporates both types of uncertainty, but the analyst
estimates either an agent error or private information speciﬁcation? Similarly, if a hybrid
model cannot be estimated due to identiﬁcation problems stemming from shared regressors,
would a private information or agent error heteroskedastic model be a close enough approx-
imation? One of the Monte Carlo experiments I conduct in the next section will address
these issues.
11The derivations of the hybrid heteroskedastic probit choice probabilities are a simple extension of the
derivations for the agent error and private information speciﬁcations, and therefore not presented here. They
are available from the author upon request.
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3 Monte Carlo Analyses
In this section, I conduct three sets of Monte Carlo analyses to assess the statistical properties
of various HSP models based on the simple game structure in Figure 1.12 In the ﬁrst set
of simulations, I evaluate the bias in a homoskedastic SP model when the data generating
process is heteroskedastic. Then, in the second set, I look at the potential bias and ineﬃciency
in ﬁtting a HSP model when there is no heteroskedasticity in the data generating process.
The last set of results is presented to demonstrate the better identiﬁcation properties of a
heteroskedastic model over the homoskedastic variant. In these simulations, a hybrid model
involving both agent error and private information as sources of uncertainty is estimated. As
argued in the previous section, such a model can only be estimated with a heteroskedastic
error structure. I then compare this model to a heteroskedastic agent error, heteroskedastic
private information, and homoskedastic SP models.
[Table 1 is about here]
The equations below summarize the general structure of the three Monte Carlo analyses.
Table 1 lists the parameters manipulated in the Monte Carlo analyses and summarizes the
values they take in each set of simulations.
U1(Y1) = β110 + β11X11 (13)
U1(Y2) = β12X12 (14)
U1(Y3) = β130 + β13X13 + β13aX1 + β13bXc (15)
U2(Y2) = 0 (16)
U2(Y3) = β230 + β23X23 + β23aX2 + β23bXc (17)
12Monte Carlo data sets and the simulation code are available upon request.
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where X1, X2, and Xc ∼ Uniform(0, 1), and the rest of Xi ∼ Normal(0, 1). For identiﬁcation
reasons, U2(Y2) is normalized to zero and U1(Y2) does not include a constant. There are
several shared regressors in this speciﬁcation: X1 appears in Player 1’s utility for outcome
Y3, as well as Player 1’s private information variance speciﬁcation. Similarly, X2 appears in
Player 2’s utility for outcome Y3 and Player 2’s private information variance speciﬁcation.
Xc is a common regressor that appears in both Player 1 and 2’s utilities for Y3, and also
their private information variance speciﬁcations. The rest of the regressors are included in
only one utility.
For the private information speciﬁcation, which is used in Monte Carlo analyses 1 and 3,
ij ∼ N(0, υ2i ), and
υ1 = exp(α1X1p + α1aX1 + α1bXc) (18)
υ2 = exp(α2X2p + α2aX2 + α2bXc) (19)
where Xip ∼ U(0, 1), and the rest of the regressors are as deﬁned previously. For the agent
error variance, which is used in the data generating process of Monte Carlo experiment 3,
εij ∼ N(0, ν2i ), with
ν1 = exp(γ1X1e) (20)
ν2 = exp(γ2X2e), (21)
where Xie ∼ U(0, 1).
3.1 MC Analysis 1: Failure to Model Heteroskedasticity
In this experiment, I evaluate the bias in a homoskedastic SP and an agent error HSP model
when the data generating process is heteroskedastic with a private information component.
The homoskedastic SP model used in the analysis employs a private information speciﬁca-
13
tion which does not correct for heteroskedasticity. The agent error heteroskedastic model
corrects for heteroskedasticity, but speciﬁes regressors Xip, Xi, and Xc for each player in
the agent error variance parameter rather than the private information variance, resulting in
a functional form misspeciﬁcation. Finally, the private information HSP model follows the
functional form and regressor speciﬁcation of the data generating process.
The ﬁrst row of Table 1 summarizes the parameter values used in the experiment. I
generate simulation data based on these values, and estimate the three models for sample
sizes N = {200, 300, 500, 1000, 2500, 5000, 10000}.13
[Table 2 is about here]
Table 2 presents the estimation results for four coeﬃcients from the models: β13, β23b, α1b,
and the standard error estimate for β13. For each sample size and the estimator, the table
gives a 95% conﬁdence interval based on the simulated coeﬃcient values. In each cell, the
top number is the lower bound, and the bottom value is the upper bound of the conﬁdence
interval. The table shows that, out of the three estimators considered, the private information
HSP oﬀers coeﬃcients closest to the true data generating value for each parameter.
[Table 3 is about here]
However, a direct comparison of coeﬃcients across the three models might potentially
be misleading, as each coeﬃcient might be scaled diﬀerently for each estimator due to the
presence of heteroskedasticity. For this reason, Table 3 oﬀers a more accurate comparison
by evaluating each estimator’s performance in predicting the probability of outcome 3, or
P (Y3) = p1 × p2, which is on average around .25 in the data generating process. For each
13For the ﬁrst ﬁve sample sizes, 2500 iterations were completed. The number of Monte Carlo iterations is
2000 for N=5000, and 750 for N=10000.
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sample size, Table 3 oﬀers three indicators:
Mean Bias =
√
mean [(PrEi (Y3)− PrDGPi (Y3))2] (22)
Maximum Bias =
√
max [(PrEi (Y3)− PrDGPi (Y3))2] (23)
Median % Bias = median
[√
(PrEi (Y3)− PrDGPi (Y3))2
/
PrDGPi (Y3)
]
(24)
For an observation i, PrEi (Y3) denotes a given estimator’s probability estimate for outcome
Y3, and Pr
DGP
i (Y3) is the same outcome probability according to the data generating process.
Intuitively, Mean Bias is the root mean squared error (RMSE), or it measures the average
bias – in absolute terms – in the outcome probability estimate of a given estimator for a
given observation. Each reported value in the table is the mean value of this statistic in
the 2500 MC iterations completed for a speciﬁc sample size. The standard deviation of the
statistic is also reported in parentheses below the mean value. For instance, the ﬁrst cell on
the left reports a value .092, which indicates that in 2500 samples simulated for sample size
N=200, on average there was .092 bias in the outcome probability estimate of the private
information heteroskedastic model. Similarly, Maximum Bias reports the largest bias, in
absolute magnitude, in the probability estimate in a given simulation sample. The reported
value in the table takes the mean of these largest bias values over the 2500 samples simulated.
Finally, Median % Bias calculates the bias in absolute terms as a percentage of the actual
probability estimate from the true data generating process, and takes the median value in a
given sample. The table reports the mean of these median values for the simulation samples.
Substantively, this measure diﬀerentiates a .10 bias in the probability parameter when the
true probability from the data generating process is .20 versus .80. Even though the absolute
bias is the same in both cases, the bias might be regarded as more severe in the former than
the latter relative to the true probability value.
According to the Mean Bias measure, the HSP estimator with the private information
speciﬁcation produces probability estimates with a relatively small bias in small samples,
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and this bias disappears as the sample size gets larger. The agent error speciﬁcation has a
slightly larger bias, which also gets smaller as the sample size increases. The homoskedastic
SP, on the other hand, on average has more biased probability estimates. The bias in the
homoskedastic SP estimates does not disappear as the sample size increases, and for a given
observation, the expected bias converges to around .118. This is quite large considering
that the average value of the outcome probability P (Y3) in the data generating process is
.25. This is also veriﬁed by the Median % Bias indicator. Even in samples of larger
sizes, the homoskedastic estimator produces probability estimates with biases that are on
average around 35% of the actual outcome probability. The private information and the
agent error heteroskedastic models, in contrast, produce smaller biases in percentage terms,
which disappear as the sample size increases.
Finally, in terms of the Maximum Bias criterion, the homoskedastic estimator on av-
erage produces at least one probability estimate that diﬀers from P (Y3) by as much as .60
in each sample. This large bias does not disappear in larger sample sizes. In contrast, the
private information and the agent error heteroskedastic speciﬁcations produce milder maxi-
mum biases, which get smaller for larger sample sizes. For N=10000, for instance, the largest
deviation from P (Y3) in the sample is on average about .19 for both estimators.
To sum up, the Monte Carlo analysis shows that, when heteroskedasticity is present
in the data generating process of a SP model, the estimator should correct for it to avoid
potential bias. The results suggest that, for a simple game structure like the one considered
here, it does not make much practical diﬀerence if the agent error or the private information
speciﬁcation is used to model heteroskedasticity. As long as heteroskedasticity is accounted
for in the estimation, the small misspeciﬁcation of the functional form with the agent error
model is not of a major concern. On the other hand, when heteroskedasticity is present, the
failure to correct for it can result in bias and misleading inference.14
14One potential caveat to this result is that HSP is a slightly more data intensive approach than the
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3.2 MC Analysis 2: Fitting a Heteroskedastic Model When Errors
Are Homoskedastic
What happens if heteroskedasticity is not present in the data generating process and the
analyst ﬁts a heteroskedastic model? Would this be a source of bias or ineﬃciency in the
estimates? This Monte Carlo experiment assesses the eﬀects of running a HSP model, when
the underlying model is in fact homoskedastic with private information speciﬁcation. The
second row of Table 1 lists the parameter values used to generate the Monte Carlo data for
analysis. As the table shows, all the coeﬃcients in the agent error and private information
variance components take the value of 0 to make the data generating process homoskedastic.
The two heteroskedastic models in the experiment unnecessarily include variables Xip, Xia,
and Xc in their uncertainty variance speciﬁcations for players i=1,2.
[Table 4 is about here]
Table 4 summarizes the simulation results for coeﬃcients β13, β23b, α1b, and the standard
error estimate of β13. Not surprisingly, except for a minor small sample bias, the homoskedas-
tic SP successfully captures all the parameters. Moreover, the conﬁdence intervals produced
by the homoskedastic estimator narrow as the sample size increases, indicating consistency.
The HSP estimator with private information speciﬁcation also approximates the population
coeﬃcient values well. As in the homoskedastic case, there seems to be a minor small sam-
ple bias which disappears with larger sample sizes. The agent error heteroskedastic model
seems to fare slightly worse than the private information version for Player 1’s coeﬃcients,
due to the misspeciﬁcation of the uncertainty structure. Yet, even this estimator provides
homoskedastic variant due to the extra parameters being estimated in the model. For this reason, especially
in smaller samples, users are advised to carefully evaluate convergence of their estimates by running their
model with multiple starting values, as well as utilizing diﬀerent optimization algorithms that are oﬀered by
statistical software.
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close enough approximation for coeﬃcients. The main diﬀerence between the homoskedas-
tic versus the heteroskedastic variants seems to be estimation uncertainty, in particular the
width of the conﬁdence intervals, and the size of the standard errors. Not surprisingly, the
presence of irrelevant parameters in the heteroskedastic estimators decreases the eﬃciency of
the estimated coeﬃcients. Both heteroskedastic models produce wider conﬁdence intervals,
and larger standard errors than the homoskedastic model.
Interestingly, the coeﬃcient estimates for the variance speciﬁcation of the two het-
eroskedastic models reveal that both models estimate coeﬃcients that are not statistically
diﬀerent from zero when there is no heteroskedasticity. This is true even for the coeﬃcient
of the regressor Xc, which appears in both players’ heteroskedastic variance speciﬁcations,
as well as in their utility speciﬁcations for outcome Y3. The models managed to isolate the
eﬀect of this variable on the utilities by estimating βib successfully, and reported no eﬀect for
the variance speciﬁcation by estimating αib not distinguishable from 0. This is reassuring,
as it means that the heteroskedastic models are not likely to result in incorrect inference
regarding actor-level variance in the amount of uncertainty, and they are not more likely
than the homoskedastic model to cause Type I errors.
As in the previous Monte Carlo analysis, I look at three indicators, Mean, Maximum,
and Median % Bias, to evaluate the three models’ relative performance in predicting
P(Y3). These indicators are presented in Table 5. All three indicators suggest that, the
homoskedastic SP model has a small sample advantage over the heteroskedastic variants
in terms of the accuracy of the probability predictions. When N=200, on average, a given
prediction from the homoskedastic model has about .07 bias, while the two heteroskedastic
models on average miss the true probability value by .10. However, this advantage disappears
as the sample size increases. For N=10000, the diﬀerence in the mean bias between the
homoskedastic and the HSP models considered is less than .01.
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[Table 5 is about here]
To sum up, this Monte Carlo analysis demonstrates that, statistically, modeling het-
eroskedasticity when it is absent in the data generating process is not as serious of a problem
as failing to model heteroskedasticity when it is present. The former is mainly an eﬃciency
problem, which disappears in larger samples, while the latter is a potential source of bias
and inconsistency.15
3.3 MC Analysis 3: A Hybrid Heteroskedastic Model
In this Monte Carlo experiment, I evaluate the bias in the agent error and private information
HSP models, as well as a homoskedastic SP model, when the underlying theoretical model
is a hybrid model that incorporates both agent error and private information as sources of
uncertainty. The underlying game structure is the same as in the previous two Monte Carlo
analyses. The last row of Table 1 lists the parameter values used to generate the data with a
hybrid uncertainty structure. This hybrid heteroskedastic model includes Xip in the private
information variance, and Xie in agent error variance for each player. The heteroskedastic
private information model, in contrast, includes both Xip and Xie in the private information
variance for each player. Similarly, the agent error heteroskedastic model includes these
variables in the agent error variance. Finally, the homoskedastic model puts these regressors
in each player’s utility for outcome Y3, and assumes a private information speciﬁcation with
a constant variance.
[Table 6 is about here]
15That being said, the ineﬃciency-bias trade-oﬀ between HSP and the homoskedastic SP needs to be
evaluated carefully in small samples. When the sample is small, users should at least consider reporting
both the HSP and the homoskedastic SP results. If none of the coeﬃcients in the error speciﬁcation are
signiﬁcant in HSP, the homoskedastic SP should be preferred.
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Table 6 presents the coeﬃcient estimates of β13, β23b, α1b from the four estimators. Sim-
ilarly, Table 7 provides a comparison of the predictive performance of the four models by
focusing on outcome probability estimates. Not surprisingly, the results suggest that the
hybrid model provides probability estimates with the least bias among the four models. In
contrast, the homoskedastic SP produces coeﬃcients with the largest outcome probability bi-
ases. For each of the four estimators, the bias in probability estimates becomes smaller, and
the estimates get more eﬃcient as the sample size increases. However, even with N=10000,
there is a sizeable average bias in the homoskedastic model’s probability estimates for a given
observation (∼.08). The agent error and the private information heteroskedastic models, in
contrast, produce smaller biases on average (∼ .04).
[Table 7 is about here]
To sum up, this analysis shows that, a hybrid heteroskedastic model incorporating both
types of uncertainty can be estimated if mutually exclusive regressors are used to model the
private information and the agent error variances for each player. Second, even if the under-
lying data structure is a hybrid model, ﬁtting a heteroskedastic model with an agent error or
private information speciﬁcation does not cause serious problems: as long as heteroskedas-
ticity is accounted for, misspecifying the uncertainty structure only introduces minor bias
as long as all the regressors for heteroskedasticity are included in the variance speciﬁcation.
This is reassuring, because it suggests that even if the underlying hybrid model does not
have mutually exclusive regressors for the agent error and the private information variance
– hence a hybrid model cannot be identiﬁed – ﬁtting a slightly misspeciﬁed heteroskedastic
model with only one source of uncertainty present but all the regressors included provides
a close enough approximation. The failure to model heteroskedasticity when it is present,
on the other hand, creates more serious problems and increases the danger of misleading
inference.
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4 Applications of Heteroskedastic Strategic Models
The previous section has only considered the statistical beneﬁts of incorporating heteroskedas-
ticity in strategic models for more accurate inferences. Given that many statistical models
in the discipline are probably only approximations of more complex functional relationships,
and various forms of misspeciﬁcations might almost always be present in empirical analyses
due to data issues or computational diﬃculties, the bias reduction achieved by incorporating
heteroskedasticity in a strategic model by itself might be considered a limited contribution.
Fortunately, HSP models studied in this paper have signiﬁcant substantive value as well,
as they make possible addressing many interesting research questions that have not been
considered before due to the lack of appropriate methods. Below, I discuss two application
areas for heteroskedastic models. First, I provide a replication of an existing study that uses
a homoskedastic strategic probit model. I then discuss the potential extension of the model
I develop in this paper to recent strategic models of signaling and belief updating. These
examples show that, using this method, interesting research questions can be addressed on
the amounts of uncertainty in a strategic interaction.
4.1 Application I: An Analysis of Speculative Currency Crises
In order to demonstrate the beneﬁts of using the HSP estimator, in this section I replicate
Leblang (2003)’s analysis of speculative currency attacks.16 Speculative attacks on curren-
cies is one of the important areas of research in international political economy (Obstfeld,
1996; Morris and Shin, 1998; Leblang, 2003; Leblang and Satyanath, 2006). The main goal
of this replication is not to show that Leblang’s results are biased due to unmodeled het-
eroskedasticity. Instead, this section aims to show that, by modeling the variance parameter
16I pick Leblang’s analysis for replication because, ﬁrst, it is an inﬂuential article that focuses on the
strategic aspect of speculative attacks; second, it uses a SP estimator to incorporate strategic interaction
into empirical analysis; and third, the replication data set was kindly provided by the author.
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in the study of speculative attacks, interesting new research questions can be addressed and
additional insights can be gained that can improve our understanding of this important
phenomenon, and structure the future debate on this topic.
Why do speculative attacks on exchange rate pegs occur? Why do some governments al-
low their currency to devalue while others take costly measures to defend their currency? To
answer these questions, Leblang employs a homoskedastic SP model. He theorizes that spec-
ulative attacks are a result of strategic interaction between speculators in currency markets
and policy makers in governments. He argues that speculators attack national currencies
based on their expectations about policymakers’ policy response, which in turn depends on
institutional, electoral, and partisan factors (Leblang, 2003).
The interaction between international ﬁnancial markets (Market) and policymakers in
a government (Government) starts with Market deciding between initiating a speculative
attack or not. If Market initiates, Government can either defend or devalue its currency.
The three outcomes of the game, therefore, are Status Quo, Devaluation, and Defense. Using
a homoskedastic SP model, Leblang estimates Market ’s Devaluation and Defense utilities,
and Government ’s Devaluation utility with constants. To model Market ’s Status Quo util-
ity, Leblang uses Capital controls, Log(reserves/base money), Exchange rate overvaluation,
Domestic credit growth, U.S. domestic interest rates, Debt service, Contagion, and Number
of prior attacks. In Government ’s Defend utility, included variables are Uniﬁed government,
Log(exports/GDP), Campaign and election period, Post-election period, Right government,
Real interest rate, Capital controls, and Log(reserves/base money). Table 9 provides de-
scriptions of the variables used in replicating Leblang’s results.17
[Table 9 is about here]
A replication of Leblang’s homoskedastic SP results is presented in the left half of Table
17For a more detailed description of these variables and their coding, see Leblang (2003), page 544.
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8. The homoskedastic SP model that Leblang uses assumes that the uncertainty variance
is constant across observations in the sample. Leblang’s data set consists of monthly obser-
vations of 90 developing economies from January 1985 to December 1998, a total of 7240
observations. Given the size and the range of this sample, heteroskedasticity constitutes a
valid concern that might aﬀect inferences. More importantly, scholars might be interested
in ﬁnding out factors inﬂuencing the levels of uncertainty in this strategic interaction. For
example, it would be interesting to test if there are any factors aﬀecting the likelihood of
sub-optimality in Market ’s choice of launching speculative currency attacks against diﬀerent
governments, which can be captured with a HSP model with agent error speciﬁcation.
[Table 8 is about here]
Thus, in Table 8, I also present the results from a HSP model with agent error speciﬁ-
cation, which hypothesizes that Market ’s agent error variance, or speculators’ tendency to
make suboptimal choices, changes across observations as a function of certain political fac-
tors in the target country.18 More speciﬁcally, I test the hypothesis that Market ’s tendency
to make suboptimal speculative attacks increases during campaign and election periods, rep-
resenting an environment with additional political uncertainty. I also test if the regime type
of the target country, measured by the country’s Polity score (Marshall and Jaggers, 2007),
has any eﬀect on Market ’s agent error variance in deciding to launch a speculative attack or
not.19
According to Table 8, substantively interesting results emerge from the heteroskedastic
18The possibility that speculators are not perfectly rational, fully informed agents has been acknowledged
in the literature before (e.g. Calvo and Mendoza (2000)).
19For simplicity, I assume that the agent error in Government ’s response to these attacks is homoskedastic,
because of the small number of observations in which governments actually get to choose. In the sample,
there are only 88 cases of speculative attacks out of 7240 observations, and this rarety of crisis cases makes
it diﬃcult to ﬁt a heteroskedastic model for Government ’s decision node as well. With the availability of
new data with more speculative attacks, a fully heteroskedastic model can be estimated.
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model’s variance estimates.20 Results indicate that the politically uncertain campaign and
election periods do not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on Market ’s tendency to make suboptimal
choices in their decision to initiate a speculative attack or not. In contrast, regime type
has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on Market ’s error variance. The positive signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of the
Polity variable suggests that, when speculators face a potential target country that is more
democratic, they are more likely to make a choice that is suboptimal in deciding to launch
a speculative attack against the country’s currency. Substantively, based on this result,
the agent error variance of Market increases by 22% from an autocratic to a democratic
target state (the full range of the Polity variable). This is an important result, because it
suggests that existing studies on democracy’s eﬀect on the likelihood of speculative attacks
provide only a partial picture of the relationship between regime type and speculative attacks.
While the previous literature has produced mixed results on this relationship (Leblang and
Satyanath, 2006, 2008), the application of HSP in this paper suggests that democracy makes
speculators more likely to make a suboptimal choice in their decision, which might in turn
inﬂuence their likelihood of launching a speculative attack against a democratic country.
Why do democratic countries make markets more likely to pick suboptimal choices? One
possibility is that there is additional uncertainty associated with democratic governments’
responses to a potential speculative attack, which increases the likelihood of a suboptimal
decision by speculators. Although it has been argued that democratic systems are more
transparent and should be associated with reduced policy uncertainty (Broz, 2002), scholars
have also argued that a divided government in a democracy might increase the uncertainty
markets have (Leblang and Satyanath, 2006). More generally, the existence of multiple
groups in democracies that might inﬂuence policy choices can make it hard for markets
20The utility estimates between the two models, on the other hand, are quite similar. Only a couple of
diﬀerences exist between the utility estimates of Leblang’s homoskedastic and the alternative HSP models.
In particular, Reserves in Government ’s utility becomes signiﬁcant, and Prior Attacks in Market ’s utility
loses its signiﬁcance in the heteroskedastic model.
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to predict a potential response by democratic governments to a speculative attack. For
instance, while Tsebelis (2002) argues that the existence of veto players might make policy
change diﬃcult in political systems, it is also possible that the multiplicity of veto groups in
democracies, and bargaining among them over policy decisions might introduce additional
uncertainty for markets. In less democratic countries, in contrast, there are relatively fewer
groups that might inﬂuence the government’s response to a speculative attack, which reduces
the uncertainty markets have about the government’s response, reducing the likelihood that
they make a suboptimal choice in their decision to initiate a speculative attack or not.
Even though the HSP model provides a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for Democracy, does it
signiﬁcantly fare better than Leblang’s original model in terms of model ﬁt? I use a likelihood
ratio test suggested by Alvarez and Brehm (1995) in the context of heteroskedasticity to
evaluate if a heteroskedastic strategic probit model is necessary over the homoskedastic
probit estimated by Leblang. In this test, the “null” model is the homoskedastic SP model
that restricts the variance to be constant across observations, and the alternative model
is the heteroskedastic model that does not make such a restriction. The test compares the
likelihoods of the two models, by calculating the likelihood ratio statistic LRS = −2(LHom−
LHet), where LHom and LHet are the log-likelihoods of the two models. This statistic follows
a χ2 distribution, with degrees of freedom equal to the number of parameters in the variance
speciﬁcation of the heteroskedastic model. In comparing the two models in Table 8, LRS
is equal to 6.17, which is signiﬁcant at the .05 level. This indicates that the heteroskedastic
model provides a statistically signiﬁcant improvement in model ﬁt over Leblang’s original
results.21
21In a working paper, Keele and Park (2005) warn users of heteroskedastic probit models of the danger
of fragile identiﬁcation, which, they claim, can be hard to detect. As a minimum precautionary step, they
suggest the users of heteroskedastic probit models to use diﬀerent starting values in estimation. In this
replication, I accordingly used 2,000 random starting values and a variety of maximization algorithms to
estimate the model. At the end, estimation always reached the same set of coeﬃcient values presented in
Table 8.
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Are there alternative mechanisms through which democracies might inﬂuence the agent
error variance of markets? Are there other political or economic factors that inﬂuence mar-
kets’ or governments’ behavior and the overall amount of uncertainty in this strategic inter-
action? Further study beyond the scope of this paper is needed to answer these questions.
The main goal of this replication was to show that modeling variance can reveal new and
important information about the levels of uncertainty during speculative crises, which was
not available from previous studies on this subject that mainly focus on explaining the like-
lihood of speculative attacks. Hopefully these results will initiate a fruitful debate on this
topic.
4.2 Application II: Heteroskedasticity and Bayesian Updating
In recent years, increased attention has been given in the international relations literature
to strategic models that incorporate signaling and Bayesian updating (Lewis and Schultz,
2003; Whang, 2010). The strategic models I have considered in this paper so far do not
have this feature, as they involve only one decision node per actor in the game, making
signaling and updating irrelevant. When an actor moves more than once in a game with
uncertainty, however, the possibility of signaling and belief updating by players emerges, as
players can come up with better estimates of their opponent’s future behavior by observing
their previous choices. Heteroskedasticity can easily be incorporated into these models as
well, by linking the uncertainty parameter to regressors. Below, I discuss the potential
statistical and substantive advantages of doing so.
[Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 depicts a simple crisis model with signaling, analyzed in Lewis & Schultz (2003).
Two states, A and B, dispute over a good that is possessed by B. In this interaction, A ﬁrst
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decides to challenge the status quo or not. If A does not challenge, status quo (SQ) is the
outcome, with payoﬀs SA and SB to A and B, respectively. If A challenges B, B can resist
the challenge, or concede the good. If B does not resist, the outcome CD gives the good
to A peacefully, with payoﬀ VA to A, and CB to B, representing the cost to B of losing the
good. If B resists, on the other hand, A can either stand ﬁrm and use force (SF), or back
down (BD). SF gives war payoﬀs WA and WB to A and B, respectively, and BD gives the
audience cost a to A, and VB to B, representing the value of the good for B.
This is a game of two-sided incomplete information where both states have uncertainty
about their opponent’s preferences. In particular, A is uncertain about B’s payoﬀ from war,
WB, and B is uncertain about both a andWA. Similar to the SP speciﬁcation in the previous
section, the uncertainty about the opponent’s payoﬀs is represented by normally distributed
random variables attached to observable outcome utilities: WA = WA + A; a = a+ a; and
WB = WB + B, where i represent a player’s private information that cannot be observed
by the opponent.
There is signaling and updating in this game because A’s ﬁrst decision potentially reveals
information about A’s choice in this player’s second decision node. In particular, B updates
its belief about A’s likelihood of ﬁghting, after observing A’s challenge decision. Lewis
and Schultz (2003) use the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) concept to analyze the
game and derive the equilibrium probabilities, including B’s posterior and prior beliefs.
The probabilities of A challenging (pC), B resisting (pR), B’s prior belief about A ﬁghting
(pF ), and B’s posterior belief about A ﬁghting given a challenge (pF |C) can be calculated as
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follows:22
pR = Φ
[
pF |C + (1− pF |C)VB − CB
pF |Cσ
]
(25)
pC = 1− Φ
(
SA − (1− pR)VA − pRWA
pRσ
)
Φ
(
SA − (1− pR)VA − pRa
pRσ
)
(26)
pF |C = Φ2
(
WA − a
σ
√
2
,
pRWA + (1− pR)VA − SA
pRσ
,
1√
2
)/
pC (27)
pF = Φ
(
WA − a
σ
√
2
)
(28)
From a statistical point of view, this updating model has a relatively more complex game
structure compared to the models I considered so far. Simple strategic models with no
updating, as discussed in the previous section, result in a recursive system of probability
equations, which implies dependence of actor choices on predictions about other actors’
preferences later in the game. Hence, in the models I considered, any bias in a choice
probability is transferred to the probability estimates for upper decision nodes, but this bias
does not aﬀect probability estimates for choices further down the game tree. The Bayesian
updating model analyzed in Lewis & Schultz (2003), in contrast, displays a stronger, non-
recursive interdependence of choices: because of the updating and signaling dynamics in
the model, each actor choice probability depends directly or indirectly on the rest of the
probabilities in the model, and any bias in any choice probability has implications for the
rest of the probabilities.
Lewis & Schultz (2003) make a homoskedasticity assumption about σ, the standard
deviation of the random private information components capturing the amount of private
information. Is this a restrictive assumption in a Bayesian updating model? It is clear that σ
plays a role in all four probabilities of Lewis & Schultz’s (2003) model. Thus, as in the simpler
strategic models considered in the previous section, the misspeciﬁcation of this parameter
will likely be a source of bias in the equilibrium probability estimates. Moreover, because of
22A detailed derivation of these probabilities appears in Lewis & Schultz (2003).
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the stronger interdependence in a signaling model, the failure to model heteroskedasticity –
if it exists – is likely to have even more serious eﬀects on the estimation results and inferences
than in a simple strategic model with no updating.23 This is especially a relevant issue in
international relations empirical analysis as the data sets analyzed tend to be cross-sectional
and show a high level of actor heterogeneity.
By aﬀecting B’s prior and posterior estimates of A’s ﬁghting choice, parameter σ also
indirectly aﬀects the amount of updating by B in the Lewis & Schultz (2003) model. The
equilibrium amount of updating – the diﬀerence between B’s prior and posterior estimates
of Player A’s probability of ﬁghting at the last node – equals to:
pF |C − pF =
Φ2
(
WA−a
σ
√
2
, pRWA+(1−pR)VA−SA
pRσ
, 1√
2
)
pC
− Φ
(
WA − a
σ
√
2
)
(29)
In this expression, the variance parameter appears in a non-linear form in both B’s pos-
terior and prior estimates. Figure 3 plots B’s prior and posterior probability estimates of
A’s ﬁghting choice, and shows the amount of updating as a function of σ for an example
speciﬁcation used in Lewis & Schultz (2006).24 This example clearly shows that the amount
of updating varies depending on the amount of initial uncertainty, and that it is non-linear
and non-monotonic in the amount of private information Players A and B have. For this
speciﬁc example, the largest amount of updating occurs when σ ∼ .83, and the amount of
updating diminishes at a higher rate for σ < .83 and at a lower rate for σ > .83.
[Figure 3 about here]
This relationship between σ and updating is relevant to a recent debate in the literature
regarding the amount of updating in strategic models of signaling. Scholars have argued
23Heteroskedasticity can easily be incorporated into this model by using the following link function: σ =
exp(γZ) where Z is the set of regressors (excluding a constant) that are expected to aﬀect the error variance,
and γ is the coeﬃcient vector for these regressors.
24In this example, SA = 0, VA = 1, VB = 1, CB = 0, W¯A = −2.9, W¯B = −.5, and a¯ = −3.5.
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that, in the existing statistical models of signaling, the estimated amount of updating by
players remains limited (Lewis and Schultz, 2006; Wand, 2006). The analysis here suggests
that misspeciﬁcation of the uncertainty parameter is a potential reason for limited updating
found in a signaling model that assumes homoskedastic errors. If a sample of international
crises includes countries with diﬀerent amounts of private information, which implies diﬀerent
levels of updating by their opponents, using a model that forces each country to have the
same amount of private information might result in misleading inferences about not only
actor choices but also the levels of updating by actors.
Modeling σ with regressors to capture this heterogeneity, instead of assuming a constant
σ across all observations in the sample, can eliminate this bias, and also provide scholars with
new insights into factors inﬂuencing the amount of private information and belief updating
in international relations. In the international conﬂict literature, for instance, it has been
argued that democracies signal their preferences more eﬀectively during international crises.
Modeling σ can help us test if democracies enter into a crisis with lower levels of private
information to begin with, or if their opponents experience a larger shift in their beliefs
compared to opponents of other countries.
5 Conclusion
The objective of this paper has been to oﬀer a method to capture actor-level variations
in the amounts of uncertainty in statistical models of strategic interaction that has been
gaining popularity in recent years in the international relations literature. The Monte Carlo
analyses presented in this paper have shown that, if not controlled for, the presence of
heteroskedasticity in the uncertainty parameters of such models can be a source of bias
and inconsistency in estimates. The method proposed here accounts for heteroskedasticity,
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without adding signiﬁcant complexity to the estimation and interpretation of these models.
More importantly, one major advantage of the proposed method is that it makes pos-
sible answering many substantively interesting questions about the levels of uncertainty in
a strategic interaction, which have been mostly avoided in the literature due to the lack of
appropriate methodological tools to measure the theoretical concepts. The models presented
in this paper are valuable tools for analyzing factors that aﬀect the severity of informational
asymmetry, sources of suboptimal behavior, and the amount of Bayesian updating in strate-
gic situations. They promise international relations researchers new and important venues
for future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Heteroskedastic SP with Private Information Speciﬁcation
With the private information speciﬁcation, an important assumption in the underlying game
theoretic model is that players possess private information about their payoﬀs, and as op-
posed to the agent error speciﬁcation, they are assumed to act perfectly rationally given the
information available to them. The true utility for Player i from outcome Yj, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}
is U∗i (Yj), and only Player i can observe this perfectly. The other player and the analyst
have uncertainty about the exact payoﬀ Player i gets from outcome Yj. The uncertainty is
formalized as a stochastic term εij attached to the outcome utilities:
U∗i (Yj) = Ui(Yj) + εij (30)
The systematic part of the utility U∗i (Yj) is common knowledge to everyone, including the
analyst. However, only Player i observes εij and the opponent and the analyst have distri-
butional information about it. εij are assumed to follow N(0, υ
2
ik).
Similar to the agent error speciﬁcation, in order to derive the choice probabilities, we
need to work backwards up the game tree. Player 2 chooses a4 over a3 if U
∗
2(a4) ≥ U∗2(a3).
Thus,
pPI2 = Pr(U
∗
2 (a4) ≥ U∗2 (a3)) (31)
= Pr(U2(Y3) + ε24 ≥ U2(Y2) + ε23) (32)
= Φ
(
U2(Y3)− U2(Y2)√
υ223 + υ
2
24
)
(33)
Deriving Player 1’s choice probabilities can be done in a similar way:
pPI1 = Pr(EU1(a2) ≥ EU1(a1)) (34)
= Pr((1− pPI2 )(U∗1 (Y2)) + pPI2 (U∗1 (Y3)) ≥ U∗1 (Y1)) (35)
= Pr((1− pPI2 )(U1(Y2) + ε13) + pPI2 (U1(Y3) + ε14) ≥ U1(Y1) + ε11) (36)
= Φ
⎛
⎝(1− pPI2 )U1(Y2) + pPI2 U1(Y3)− U1(Y1)√
υ211 + (1− pPI2 )2υ213 + pPI2 2υ214
⎞
⎠ (37)
υ2ij, variance terms of the stochastic εij, represent the severity of informational asymmetry.
The larger υ2ij, the larger on average the private information Player i possesses. εij terms
are distributed normally with zero mean and standard deviation υij. As in the agent er-
ror speciﬁcation, the standard deviation varies across diﬀerent observations as functions of
regressors:
υij = exp(λD)
35
where λ represents the coeﬃcients and D is the matrix of regressors.25 The log-likelihood
function for the HSP estimator for private information speciﬁcation looks exactly the same
as the agent error version, except the diﬀerence in outcome probability estimates, and is
speciﬁed as follows:
LPI =
N∑
n=1
3∑
j=1
Inj ln(Pr
PI(Ynj)) (38)
where PrPI(Y1) = 1− pPI1 , PrPI(Y2) = pPI1 (1− pPI2 ), and PrPI(Y3) = pPI1 pPI2 .
The expressions in equations 4 and 33 reveal that the agent error and private information
speciﬁcations yield the same probability estimates for the second player. The diﬀerence is in
action probabilities for decision nodes higher in the game tree, as can be seen from equations
7 and 37.
25As in the agent error case, the constant is omitted from this speciﬁcation.
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A.2 Sample STATA Code for a Heteroskedastic SP Model
We can estimate a HSP model in STATA very easily. In order to do so, we ﬁrst deﬁne
our log-likelihood function, and then use the ml command available in Stata to perform
the maximum likelihood estimation. Suppose that the data generating process comes from
the game presented in Figure 1(A). The two variables that represent P1 and P2’s choices are
Attack, and Resist, respectively. In this example, we model utilities U1(Cap) with a regressor
X1, U1(War) with a regressor X2 and a constant, and U2(War) with a regressor X3 and a
constant. In addition, P1 and P2’s agent error variances α1 and α2 are modeled with Z1 and
Z2, respectively.
26
capture program drop heteroA lf
program define heteroA lf
args lnf u1cap u1war u2war alp1 alp2
tempvar p2res p1att expalp1 expalp2
qui gen double ‘expalp1’ = exp(‘alp1’)
qui gen double ‘expalp2’ = exp(‘alp2’)
qui gen double ‘p2res’ = normal((‘u2war’)/sqrt(2*‘expalp2’^2))
qui gen double ‘p1att’ = normal((‘p2res’*‘u1war’+(1-‘p2res’)*‘u1cap’) /*
*/ /sqrt(2*‘expalp1’^2))
qui replace ‘lnf’ = ln(‘p1att’) + ln(‘p2res’) if $ML y1 & $ML y2
qui replace ‘lnf’ = ln(1-‘p1att’) if !$ML y1
qui replace ‘lnf’ = ln(‘p1att’) + ln(1-‘p2res’) if $ML y1 & !$ML y2
end
ml model lf heteroA lf (u1cap: attack resist = x1, nocons) /*
*/ (u1war: attack resist = x2) /*
*/ (u2war: attack resist = x3) /*
*/ (alp1: attack resist = z1, nocons) /*
*/ (alp2: attack resist = z2, nocons)
ml search, r(500)
ml maximize
26In this example, U1(SQ) and U2(Cap) are normalized to zero.
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Figure 1: Theoretical Sources of Uncertainty in a Strategic Model
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Homoskedastic SP Heteroskedastic SP
Constants Market Government Market Government
Devaluation (G) -0.43 -0.04
(0.78) (0.77)
Devaluation (M) -3.66* -4.07*
(0.30) (0.34)
Defense (M) -3.14* -3.44*
(0.29) (0.32)
Homoskedastic SP Heteroskedastic SP
Market Government Market Government Market
Variable (Status Quo) (Defend) (Status Quo) (Defend) Variance (M)
Uniﬁed Government -0.35
(0.35)
-0.13
(0.41)
Export Sectort−1 -0.20
(0.17)
-0.18
(0.23)
Campaign/Election 1.66*
(0.75)
2.38*
(0.91)
-0.02
(0.10)
Post Election 1.06
(0.59)
1.21
(0.70)
Right Government -0.94*
(0.45)
-1.60*
(0.59)
Interest Ratest−1 1.93*
(0.64)
1.35*
(0.64)
Capital Controlst−1 -0.45
(0.25)
0.07
(0.75)
-0.41
(0.25)
0.51
(0.79)
Reservest−1 0.23*
(0.06)
0.31
(0.17)
-0.32*
(0.08)
0.62*
(0.20)
RER Overvaluation -0.44*
(0.09)
-0.48*
(0.09)
Credit Growtht−1 -0.06*
(0.03)
-0.07*
(0.03)
US Interest Ratest−1 -0.05
(0.06)
-0.08
(0.07)
Debt Servicet−1 -0.03
(0.05)
-0.02
(0.06)
Contagion -0.12*
(0.05)
-0.13*
(0.06)
Prior Attacks -0.12*
(0.05)
-0.10
(0.06)
Polityt−1 0.01*
(0.004)
N 7240 6345
Log-likelihood -482.02 -463.61
Table 8: Comparison of Leblang’s Homoskedastic Model with an Alternative Heteroskedastic
Model
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Variable Description
Uniﬁed Government Binary indicator for the ruling party controlling
both the executive and the lower house of the legislature
Export Sectort−1 Size of the export sector relative to GDP
Campaign/Election Binary indicator for campaign (3 months) and election times
Post Election Binary indicator for the 3-month period following
an election month
Right Government Binary indicator for a right government
Interest Ratest−1 Real interest rates
Capital Controlst−1 Binary indicator for controls on the capital account
Reservest−1 Log-ratio of total reserves to base money
RER Overvaluation Real exchange rate overvaluation
Credit Growtht−1 Domestic credit growth rate
US Interest Ratest−1 U.S. domestic interest rates
Debt Servicet−1 External debt service
Contagion Number of speculative attacks outside the country
in the same month
Prior Attacks Number of previous speculative attacks to the country
Polityt−1 Polity score of the country
Table 9: Descriptions of the Variables Used in Leblang (2003)
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Figure 2: A Crisis Bargaining Game with Bayesian Updating
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Figure 3: Sigma and the Amount of Updating
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